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Peace and the Autocrats
EVER
since the differences of opinion which are now agitating the whole country
declared themselves in the formation of two distinct parties in Bengal, there
has been a class of politicians among us who are never tired of ingeminating
peace, peace, deploring every collision between the contending schools and
entreating all to lay aside their differences and work for the country. It is
all very plausible to the ear and easily imposes on the average unthinking mind.
Union, concord, work for the country are all moving and sacred words and must
command respect — when they are not misused. But what is it that these
politicians ask us to do in the name of union, concord and work for the country?
They ask us to sacrifice or stifle our convictions and silence the promptings of
conscience in order to follow leaders whom we believe to have lost touch with
the spirit of the times and "work together unitedly" in a line of
action which we believe to be ruinous to the country. The demand has been made
quite nakedly by enthusiastic adherents of Babu Surendranath Banerji that we
should all follow the leaders blindly even when we disapprove of what they
think, say and do. A more presumptuous demand or one more destructive of all
political morality and honesty could not be made. There is such a thing
as a political conscience, even if its existence is not recognised by the
Editor
of the Bengalee; and expediency is not what that veracious journal
declares it to be, the sole god of politics, but a subordinate guide, itself
determined by higher considerations.
Of course, many of those who cry out for peace at any price, do not
perceive all that is implied in their demand. Is it not possible, they argue, to
have differences of opinion and yet work together? We should be the last to deny
it. The whole system of party politics, for example, depends on the
subordination of minor differences by those who are agreed on main and vital
points. So long therefore as the differences are minor and either
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essentially
or for the moment immaterial, there is no reason why there should not be
complete unity for all practical purposes; but the moment vital differences
arise, parties and party struggle become inevitable. The men of peace and unity
are never weary of throwing Japan and England in our faces; but they seem not to
have read the history of the countries which they offer us as our examples. Have
they never heard of the struggle between Federalists and Imperialists in Japan
or of the civil strife between Federalists and Unionists which preceded and made
the way clear for her marvellous development? It was the time when American guns
had broken open the gates of the country and she was in considerable danger from
foreign aggression; yet this was the moment chosen by the most patriotic
Japanese for a bitter party struggle attended by mutual assassination and ending
in civil slaughter. And what was the point at issue? Simply, whether Shogun or
Mikado should be leader and sovereign in Japan. Our wise men would have advised
the Japanese to give up their differences and work together under the Shogun
because he was "the recognised leader"; but the patriots of Japan knew
that the question of Shogun or Mikado involved vital issues which must be
settled at any cost; so with one hand they fended off the common enemy while
with the other they fought out the question among themselves. This is the only
solution to the difficulty which has arisen in India — to present an united
front to bureaucratic attacks while fighting out the question among ourselves.
For this amount of concord one condition is absolutely required, that neither
party shall call in the common enemy to injure or crush the other. There must be
no suppression of telegrams defending a leader of one party from official
imputations, no attempt by editorial paragraphs to implicate him as an
instigator of disorder, no assistance at viceregal interviews in which the
bureaucracy is invited to take strong measures against his propaganda.
If it is argued that the differences dividing us are not vital, we
entirely disagree. We are all agreed on one point, that the continuance of
unmitigated bureaucratic despotism is ruinous to the country and a change is
required; but beyond this point
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there
is more difference than agreement. The new party is composed of various elements
and there are minor differences of opinion and even of method among them; but
they are all agreed in one unanimous determination to put an end to despotism,
mitigated or unmitigated, and replace it by a free, modern and national
Government. The old party is also composed of various elements, —
ultra-loyalist, loyalist, ultra-moderate, moderate, and even semi-demi-extremist;
but they are all agreed on this main attitude, that while they aspire to
colonial self-government they will put up with mitigated despotism for another
century or two if vigorous petitioning will bring them nothing better. Here is a
vital difference of ideal, aim and spirit; and it is necessarily accompanied by
a vital difference in method. The new party is agreed on a policy of self-help
and the organisation at least of passive resistance. The old party is agreed
upon nothing except the sacred right of petitioning. Sir Pherozshah Mehta and
the Bombay Moderates would confine our politics within those holy limits. Pundit
Madan Mohan and the United Provinces Moderates are willing to add a moderate and
inoffensive spice of self-help; Babu Surendranath and the Bengal Moderates will
even admit passive resistance within narrow limits and for a special and
temporary purpose. But the difference of all from the new party remains.
Where there are such serious differences and men wish to follow
different paths, no lasting composition is possible. The party struggle must go
on until the country has definitely accepted one or other of the alternative
ideals and methods. Temporary working compromises are alone possible, and the
soundness of even such compromises is conditional, firstly, on the candour and
whole-heartedness with which they are undertaken on both sides, and secondly, on
the carrying on of the party struggle strictly within the rules of the game. The
present bitterness of the struggle is largely due to the disregard of these
elementary conditions. National Education is an accepted part of the political
programme in Bengal; yet all the best known and most influential of the Moderate
leaders are either practically indifferent or passively hostile to the progress
of the movement. Boycott is the cry
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of
both parties within Bengal; yet the Moderate leaders did not hesitate to
stultify the Boycott movement by the support they gave to the Swadeshi-Bideshi
Exhibition. Moreover, our experience has hitherto been that the Moderates look
on any compromise in the light of a clever manoeuvre to dish the Extremists or
a temporary convenience to stave off unpleasant opposition for the moment.
The second condition is equally disregarded. So long as it is sought to
suppress the new spirit by autocratic methods of dishonest manoeuvres, there can
be no talk of peace or unity. The conduct of Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviya and his
caucus at Allahabad has been both autocratic and dishonest. The delegates
elected at the Railway Theatre were elected according to methods that have
always been held valid by the Congress and there has never before been any
question of the right of gentlemen nominated by a large public meeting to sit in
Congress or Conference. Yet the Pundit and his crew chose by autocratic
Resolutions of a temporary Committee which had received no power to alter the
Congress constitution, to disallow the nominees of the Railway Theatre meeting!
Even the British bureaucracy itself would have blushed to perpetrate so cynical
and shameless a piece of autocracy. But these autocratic democrats had not even
the courage of their autocracy. They tried first to exclude the elected of the
people on the ridiculous plea that Mayo Hall would only hold a certain number
and therefore —
mark the logic of Moderatism!
—
this certain number must be composed of
Malaviya Moderates and the Railway Theatre Forwards excluded; but they found
that this trick would not serve. They then bolstered up their autocracy by the
excuse that Allahabad must not be over-represented at the Conference. This
excuse was a palpable trick since under the present rules it is impossible to
prevent the place of the Conference from being over-represented. As a matter of
fact among the few delegates who
attended, Allahabad had an overwhelming majority. No sane man can expect concord
and compromise between the parties while such trickery is considered a
legitimate party manoeuvre. The penalty this time has been the failure of the
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Allahabad
Conference. The penalty next time, unless the caucus learn wisdom, may be open
war and the holding of two separate Conferences in the same province.
Bande Mataram,
April 3, 1907
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